China Gold International Resources Corp. Ltd.
2099 · HKEX · Canada
Price data from its CGG listing on TSX, quoted in CAD
chinagoldintl.comFinancials as of FY2025
Extracts gold and copper from its own mines in China, processes the ore itself, and sells nearly all of it to the state-owned group that also controls it as a shareholder.
- Depends onUpstream position: supplies 6 industries, depends on 1
- ScaleMarket cap is $7.54B, above the global median of $1.18B
- PositionOperating margin is 65.8%, higher than 95% of its Other Precious Metals & Mining peers (median 18.8%)
- Interpretations5 currently firing — 5
What this company is and how it runs — written from structure, not news.
The company runs a mine-to-metal conversion system: ore is extracted and processed on site into gold doré and copper concentrate, which move through direct sales relationships with a small set of buyers rather than through open markets. It sits upstream in the wider supply chain, feeding several other industries while itself depending on inputs from another, and it carries commodity-price and currency risk on its output without hedging either.
Revenue comes entirely from one-time sales of mined and processed metal, recognized when the product is delivered and ownership passes, rather than from any recurring fee, subscription or royalty stream. Copper concentrate is the larger of its product lines and gold doré the smaller, and nearly all of that revenue is collected from a very small number of buyers within its home market.
Growth here comes mainly from expanding throughput and reserves at its existing mine sites rather than from replicating a standardized unit across many locations. A currently proposed plan at its Jiama site would shift mining to a larger-scale single method and substantially increase daily processing capacity, though it still requires a feasibility study and further approval. Its cash generation also sits toward the upper end of the range CompanyGraph observes across companies running this same kind of extractive-production system.
Its own filings describe dependence on a narrow set of physical inputs, mainly electricity, water, processing chemicals, steel grinding media and explosives, sourced mostly from domestic suppliers, plus third-party contractors for mining, engineering and construction work at its sites. All of its cash flow comes from its own mining operations rather than from outside assets, so continuity at any one site is itself a dependency, and it also depends on holding and renewing government mining, safety and environmental permits.
Nearly all of its output is bought by entities inside its own controlling shareholder's corporate group under a standing sales agreement, rather than by a broad, independent customer base. That makes its principal named dependent the same state-owned group that also controls it as a shareholder, not an arm's-length market of buyers. CompanyGraph's supply-chain mapping separately places it upstream of several other industries beyond that direct relationship, though those industries are not individually identified in what CompanyGraph has on file.
Operating a large-scale gold and copper mining and processing system is not by itself unusual: CompanyGraph maps many other companies running the same kind of production system under the same resource-depletion constraint. Within that common shape, its own disclosures show a specific feature of its structure: the same state-owned group that holds a controlling stake in the company is also the counterparty that buys almost everything it produces, linking its ownership and its route to market. Whether other companies could replicate that particular ownership-and-customer arrangement is not something the available evidence shows.
The company's own account of what limits its growth centers on physical processing capacity, not on funding: at its Jiama site, further processing was capped by the capacity to store tailings, and output stayed constrained until new storage capacity was built. That physical framing is consistent with a financial profile that shows relatively strong cash generation and low reliance on debt, which points away from access to capital as the binding limit here. More broadly, as a company that extracts a finite resource, its longer-run ability to keep producing depends on continuing to replace mined reserves at a cost below what the extracted metal is worth. Whether that broader industry-level limit is currently binding for this company specifically is not something CompanyGraph has measured directly.
Its own risk disclosures point to concentration as the main structural exposure: essentially all of its cash flow is generated by its own producing mine sites, essentially all of its revenue is collected from customers inside the same national market, and a very small number of buyers connected to its own controlling shareholder account for almost all of its sales. On top of that concentration, it names commodity-price movement and an unhedged currency exposure as risks, alongside the possibility that its reserve and resource estimates turn out to be inaccurate, and it flags reliance on timely electricity and other supplies, including power availability in winter at its Jiama site. Consistent with that price and currency exposure, its earnings have not been positive in every year on record.
Its own filings point to government approval and permitting as a continuous pressure: mining, safety, environmental and gold import or export approvals all sit with state authorities, and it names commodity-price movement and currency exchange-rate movement, which it does not hedge, as the risks it discloses first. It also discloses ongoing legal and enforcement matters connected to unpaid amounts owed to one of its subsidiaries. Separately, companies that extract a depleting resource generally face pressure to keep replacing reserves at a cost below what they can sell that resource for. Whether that specific pressure binds here is not something CompanyGraph has separately measured.
Read from the company's own filings and public materials (gathered August 2026) together with figures CompanyGraph recomputed from its statements. Written September 2026. A question with no evidence behind it is left out rather than answered.
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Sign inWhat the company actually pays, and whether its own cash supports it.
The reported statements, read against the company's own industry.
5 interpretations currently present — each is a set of fired observations whose alignment reads as one structural pattern. Click an observation to see the numbers behind it.
Screen for these patternsIs this company financially stable?
MRQ Cash Elevated Relative To Total Debt With EBITDA And FCF Elevated Relative To Total Liabilities
Cash covers most of its debt, with earnings high against its liabilities.
How does this company use capital?
Cash Backing With OCF Coverage And Cash Near Total Debt
Cash on hand covers most or all of its total debt, and cash flow matches reported earnings.
Cash-Flow Ratios Elevated
More of its sales turn into cash than in its industry, and less of that cash is consumed by reinvestment than at most of its peers.
FCF Ratios Elevated
Its free cash flow is large next to assets and equity, and more of its operating cash reaches it than in its industry.
ROE, ROA, And Operating ROA Elevated
It earns more on its equity than its industry does, and on its assets too — not on borrowing alone.
An interpretation is present only while every observation it reads stays fired (score ≥ 70). It describes what the aligned readings show — never a verdict, never a prediction.
Shared structure with peers — never a ranking.
Structural observations derived from financial data, industry benchmarks, and supply chain position.
Peer Positioning
Financial Health
Supply Chain
Scale
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