How does this company make money?
Revenue comes in each time a cargo of LNG is delivered to a buyer's import terminal in Asia. The price of each cargo is tied to oil prices under the terms of the long-term contracts with JERA, Tokyo Gas, and Korean buyers. Any gas produced beyond what those contracts require can be sold on the spot market, where prices fluctuate with immediate supply and demand.
What makes this company hard to replace?
JERA, Tokyo Gas, and Korean petrochemical buyers are locked into 15-to-20 year supply agreements that are not easy to exit. Their specific shipping slot allocations at Dampier and other Pilbara ports cannot simply be handed to another supplier. On top of that, their onshore regasification terminals are built around the cargo scheduling windows written into these contracts, so switching to a different LNG supplier would require renegotiating the timing of every delivery across a long-established chain.
What limits this company?
The Pluto LNG and North West Shelf cooling trains can only process a fixed volume of gas at a time, and that ceiling is the maximum amount of LNG that can be delivered under contract in any period. Building another train takes billions of dollars and five to seven years of construction and approvals under Western Australian and NOPSEMA regulatory processes, so even if the offshore fields produced more gas tomorrow, there is no way to get it to buyers any faster.
What does this company depend on?
The company cannot operate without Browse Basin petroleum production licences issued by NOPSEMA, the Pluto LNG processing facility in Karratha, the North West Shelf Joint Venture liquefaction infrastructure, access to a dedicated LNG carrier fleet, and the subsea pipeline network that connects the offshore platforms to the onshore facilities.
Who depends on this company?
Japanese power utilities like JERA and Tokyo Gas rely on regular cargo deliveries to keep baseload electricity generation running — a supply shortfall would leave them scrambling to cover demand. Korean petrochemical facilities depend on consistent feedstock volumes from these shipments. Asian spot LNG markets would see price swings if cargoes were delayed. Closer to home, the Western Australian gas market depends on it too, because domestic gas reservation rules require a portion of production to stay in Western Australia.
How does this company scale?
Once the Pluto and North West Shelf trains are running at full capacity, squeezing more efficiency out of cargo scheduling and plant operations costs relatively little. The hard limit is offshore field development — every new discovery in the Browse Basin or Carnarvon Basin needs its own subsea platform, its own pipeline, and its own permitting process, none of which can share the existing infrastructure. That is what keeps growth slow and expensive no matter how efficiently the onshore plants run.
What external forces can significantly affect this company?
If China shifts its import policies, Asian LNG demand and long-term contract pricing both move, because China is one of the biggest buyers in the region. Carbon border adjustment mechanisms in export markets could effectively add a cost penalty to Australian LNG, making it more expensive for buyers. Indonesian and Qatari producers are also expanding output and chasing the same Northeast Asian utility customers, which puts pressure on contract terms and pricing.
Where is this company structurally vulnerable?
If NOPSEMA revoked or refused to renew the Browse Basin petroleum production licences — because of an environmental finding, a safety ruling, or a shift in regulatory policy — the gas supply feeding the Pluto trains would drop below the volumes needed to meet long-term contract delivery commitments. The Pluto processing stake on its own produces nothing; it only generates revenue when licensed offshore gas is flowing through it. Cut off that upstream supply and the entire chain from well to cargo breaks.
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