Jilin Electric Power Co. Ltd.
000875 · SZSE · China
spicjl.comFinancials as of FY2024 · latest on file
A state-controlled generator of electricity and heat in China that earns mainly by selling power into provincial grid-settlement and market-clearing mechanisms rather than by billing end customers directly.
- Depends onDownstream position: depends on 11 industries, supplies 6
- ScaleMarket cap is $2.7B, above the global median of $1.18B
What this company is and how it runs — written from structure, not news.
It runs generation and heat plants whose output is coordinated by outside parties rather than by its own sales effort: electricity is produced to match a grid operator's dispatch plan and settled through provincial mechanism and market-clearing arrangements, while heat is delivered under direct supply contracts to heating companies and residential and industrial users. In CompanyGraph's map of company relationships it depends on more supplying industries than it in turn supplies, consistent with a generator that draws on multiple upstream input industries to feed a narrower set of buyers.
It earns by selling generated electricity mostly through provincial mechanism settlement and market-based contracts rather than open retail pricing, drawing revenue from a mix of coal-fired thermal, wind and solar generation plus a smaller heat-supply business. Coal-fired power and solar are its largest product lines, with wind close behind and heat a minor share, and its electricity revenue concentrates in a small number of grid-company buyers rather than spreading across many direct customers.
Growth here comes mainly from adding newly approved generation and energy projects, project by project and province by province, rather than from expanding sales to an existing customer base; its own account describes a pipeline of new wind, solar, coal-reliability and green-hydrogen projects moving through approval and construction. It has recorded positive net income in every year CompanyGraph has on file, and it operates within a very large population of companies that CompanyGraph classifies as running the same regulated-return kind of system, making the way it scales a common pattern rather than a rare one.
Its own account names coal as the key purchased fuel input, bought mainly from large state-owned coal enterprises under long-term contracts and topped up through spot purchases, and it identifies a seasonal fuel squeeze in its home province when coal supply tightens at demand peaks. Beyond fuel, its own risk disclosures point to dependence on the grid's capacity to absorb renewable output and on regional market-price rules it does not set itself. CompanyGraph's map of company relationships also places it downstream of a broad set of supplying industries, consistent with a generator dependent on fuel, equipment and construction inputs, though those industries are not individually named.
Its own account identifies provincial State Grid companies as its largest electricity buyers, with the remaining demand coming from heating companies, residential heat customers and industrial steam users under direct supply contracts. A small number of grid-company buyers account for most of its electricity revenue, so a limited set of counterparties depends on its output rather than a broad base of direct customers. In CompanyGraph's map of company relationships it supplies fewer industries than it depends on, consistent with a generator feeding grid and industrial-heat buyers rather than distributing directly across many end markets.
The company runs the same kind of regulated generation-and-settlement system as a very large number of other companies CompanyGraph tracks, so the way it operates here is common rather than distinctive. Its own filings point to a high share of clean-energy generating capacity and a large-scale green-hydrogen-and-ammonia demonstration project, carrying an international product certification, as things it presents as strengths, but these are the company's own claims about itself, not an independent finding that competitors cannot replicate them.
The company's own account of what limits its growth centers on absorption capacity, the grid's ability to take on more renewable output, together with regional price differences and price competition that press down on project profitability; it states that these restrict how far it can expand its energy businesses. It separately names a fuel-supply limit in its home province, where coal tightens at seasonal demand peaks. CompanyGraph generally tests regulated generation businesses against a limit set by their agreement with a regulator over allowed returns; here the company's own disclosures point more specifically to grid-absorption capacity and fuel supply as the limits it names, rather than to that return-setting relationship itself.
A single counterparty tied to provincial grid purchases accounts for a large share of its disclosed sales, and its handful of largest buyers together account for most of the rest, so revenue concentrates in a narrow set of counterparties rather than a broad customer base. Revenue is also concentrated geographically, with most of it earned in its home region in the northeast. CompanyGraph's recomputed financials separately show a period in which the company paid out more per share to shareholders than it earned per share, a capital-allocation signal distinct from its underlying profitability. The company's own risk disclosures list investment risk first among the risks it names, ahead of price and fuel risk.
The company operates under national and provincial energy-policy bodies that set the market rules and settlement mechanisms for the electricity it generates, rather than competing for customers in an open retail market. Its own risk disclosures name investment risk first among the pressures it tracks, ahead of price risk and fuel risk, and they point to a seasonal fuel squeeze in its home province and to the grid's limited capacity to absorb growing renewable output. Ongoing litigation is disclosed but described by the company as not materially affecting its results. A regulator setting the rules and prices a business operates under, rather than open competition for customers, is the general pattern CompanyGraph tests for regulated infrastructure businesses, and the pressures named here are consistent with that pattern.
Read from the company's own filings and public materials (gathered August 2026) together with figures CompanyGraph recomputed from its statements. Written August 2026. A question with no evidence behind it is left out rather than answered.
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The reported statements, read against the company's own industry.
As of FY2024 (year ended December 31, 2024). Newer annual figures aren't yet on file.
Shared structure with peers — never a ranking.
Structural observations derived from financial data, industry benchmarks, and supply chain position.
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